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Abstract—Unmanned control vehicles are used for a variety
of scenarios where the user can conduct a task from a remote
location; scenarios include surveillance, disaster recovery and
agricultural farming. The operation of unmanned vehicles is
generally conducted over a wireless communication medium.
The nature of the wireless broadcast allows attackers to exploit
security vulnerabilities through passive and active attacks; con-
sequently, cryptography is often selected as a countermeasure
to the aforementioned attacks. This paper analyses simulation
undertaken to identify the affect of cryptographic constructs
on the Quality of Service (QoS) and Quality of Experience
(QoE) of controlling an unmanned vehicle. Results indicate that
standardised AEAD cryptographic approaches can increase the
additional distance travelled by a unmanned vehicle over multiple
hops communications up to 110 meters per second.
Index Terms—Unmanned Vehicles, Security, Wireless, QoS,
QoE
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned control vehicles have been used in multiple
environments where humans are unable to access directly,
this include disaster recovery and remote surveillance [1].
Unmanned vehicles operate using manual, semi-autonomous
and autonomous control; various implementation of unmanned
vehicles have been developed which include Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAV) and Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV).
Wireless relays are used to extend the range between the base
station and vehicles [2], however, a secure communication
channel is required to prevent known security vulnerabilities
being exploited [3].
End users operating the unmanned vehicles require
responsive and operational control to maintain guidance
and movement of the travelling vehicle. Adjustment to the
Quality of Service (QoS) and Quality of Experience (QoE)
may disturb the elements contributing towards the operation
of the unmanned vehicles; therefore causing uncoordinated
and unstable control between the end users and unmanned
control vehicle.
This paper examines the balance of QoS and QoE
for unmanned vehicles and the implications of providing
a secure communication channel on the operation of
unmanned vehicles. The paper analyses the impact of
secure communications on QoS and QoE over a multi-hop
communication link in simulation. The secure channel
is provided by a cryptographic technique refereed to as
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD).
The structure of this paper is organised as follows: Section
II introduces the term, phrases and case scenario used for this
study. Section III presents existing literature to the problem
scenario discussed, Section IV outlines the experimentation
procedure. Section V discusses and analyses the results ob-
tained from simulation with Section VI discussing the impact
in relation to the case scenario. Section VII concludes.
II. PRELIMINARY
This section deﬁnes the terms used throughout this
paper and presents the context of the case scenario.
The Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)
concept provides symmetric cryptographic security services to
transmitted packetised data. AEAD combines conﬁdentiality
and integrity resulting in a secure communication channel.
Conﬁdentiality as an encrypting function is thought secure
if an adversary is unable to distinguish the ciphertexts from
a bit string chosen uniformly at random, from the set of all
possible bit strings of a speciﬁed length, under a chosen
plaintext attack. For the purpose of this paper, an integrity
check function is thought secure if it is computationally
infeasible to perform an existential forgery under an adaptive
chosen ciphertext attack.
Two AEAD paradigms are presented in this paper,
they are Counter with cipher block chaining (CCM) and
TinyAEAD. CCM is a National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) standardised AEAD construct designed
to provide integrity and conﬁdentiality using a 128-bit block
cipher [4]. The TinyAEAD construct is designed to provide
conﬁdentiality and integrity services using block ciphers of
various bit lengths [5]. This construct can be conﬁgured to
run at a reduced speciﬁed number of block cipher iterations
in order to enhance the processing speed of the construct. In
addition TinyAEAD provides ﬂexibility and adaptability that
can be applied to a broad range of contexts.
The case scenario introduces two applications of unmanned
vehicles which are UAV and UGV. Both scenarios use a
wireless network control systems to control and operate the
vehicles from a remote location. A circuit switched multi-hop
communication link is selected for the scenarios using a
linear logical network topology. The ﬁxed wing UAV scenario
is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Illustrative concept of a circuit switched linear ﬁxed wing UAV
multi-hop topology
A multi-hop propagation method to transmit control mes-
sages to the associated ﬁxed wing UAV. In this scenario com-
mand and control packet are transmitted at regular intervals
from the controlling device to the ﬁxed wing UAV through a
varying number of intermediate nodes. A similar scenario for
the UGV is presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Illustrative concept of a circuit switched linear UGV multi-hop
topology
The inﬂuence of cryptographic constructs on latency and
how this inﬂuences on the response time of the unmanned
vehicle is examined. As the wireless medium broadcasts
to devices within proximity, an attacker could passively
monitor data between the start and end point and actively
attack the link through multiple security vulnerabilities (e.g.
replay attacks). The inclusion of conﬁdentiality, integrity
and authentication to provide a secure communication
channel inﬂuences latency and instantaneous throughput
measurements, resulting in the delay of commands executed
by the unmanned vehicle. Motivation for conducting this
research is to balance QoS and QoE for unmanned control
vehicles using secure communications.
The increase in latency affects the response time of an
action, this impacts the manoeuvrability of the end device and
affect the QoE. Adjustment to throughput inﬂuences the end
device with the number of packets transmitted and received
over multiple wireless hops; this affects QoS services (i.e
video stream from the unmanned vehicle).
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
This section introduces relevant literature based on the
context of this paper with focus on QoS and QoE for
unmanned vehicles. The literature review is sectioned
into two parts, ﬁrst the current approaches undertaken by
other researchers, followed by a summary of the literature
undertaken.
A method for real-time video relay of UAV trafﬁc
surveillance systems through communication networks is
proposed by Chen et al [6]. The authors use a UAV for
trafﬁc monitoring using a video feed from the UAV which is
relayed to a ground station; the ground station forwards the
video feed to a mobile communications tower before relaying
to its intended destination. Two implementation methods are
proposed and tested, ﬁrst the mobile communication tower
forwards the data directly to the end user using wireless
communication; the second method forwards the video feed
to a host web server before the end user queries the server
for the video feed over a wired connection. Results suggests
that the server implementation was better suited for limited
bandwidth links using lower frames per second whilst higher
frames per second on limited bandwidth links are not suited
for either implementation method. The authors have also
stated that security is a concern.
Bok et al propose a context-aware QoS control for wireless
mesh networks of UAVs [7]. The authors discuss the issue
of current QoS management methods in the context of UAVs
with existing methods focused on the performance of the
UAVs in a non-time dependent situation. The proposed
solution by the authors uses a context-aware QoS scheme to
adjust the priority of the messages based on process patterns.
This is achieved by setting a ﬂag value in the IP header
to state the QoS priority of the system with a hierarchical
mesh network topology to relay communications between
the base-station and device on the network. The hierarchical
network topology used in this context assigns roles to the
UAVs on the network which are nodes and supernodes.
Standard nodes use the queue manager for its own outgoing
trafﬁc only whilst supernodes communicate directory with
the base station and standard nodes in its subgroup and is
responsible for forwarding trafﬁc of all nodes in its network.
The work presented in this paper represent a prototype of the
system.
QoS trade-offs for real-time video has been researched
by Hansen and Hissam [8]. The problem examined by
the authors is the changing requirements and needs of the
end user over the course of time (e.g. emergency and ﬁrst
responder situations). A model is proposed by the authors for
managing the QoS requirements as a means of quantifying
QoE of the end user by proposing the Distributed Quality
of Service Resource Allocation Model (D-Q-RAM). The
D-Q-RAM proposes a method for solving optimisation
problems in a distributed manner and is used in this papers
context for bandwidth. The experimentation undertaken
compares the frames per second against the image resolution
for two different mission requirements. The Timed Averaged
Unit (TAU) is created by the authors as a QoE metric. The
test platform consists of six wireless routers and laptops
operating at 2.4MHz. Each device was place 300m apart
using a mesh routing protocol with unicast UDP packets
selected to transmit video trafﬁc from the server to the end
user. The change between the mission requirements occurs
in increments during run time using four video ﬂows from
different radios. Results obtained suggest that the D-Q-RAM
method is suited for adjusting the QoS requirements for the
user but the TAU model does not take into consideration
dropped frames.
Ibarrola et al examine web QoE evaluation in multi-
agent network with validation of the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU)-T G.1030 framework
[9]. The authors propose an update of the current G.1030
standard by taking into consideration QoE of the user
expectations and the user feedback. The authors undertook
experiments using an emulation test platform to benchmark
their modiﬁed version of the G.1030 framework with
adjustments to the scaled session times for slow, medium
and fast browsers to be applicable with present networks.
Two experiments were conducted with participants ﬁrst
experiencing the slowest to fastest browser, then the second
experiment fastest to slowest. All experiments undertaken
used 49 random sessions with 11 skilled and 25 unskilled
participants ﬁlling a questionnaire based on the experience
of the system. Results indicate that additional delay has
inﬂuence on download times with longer delays inducing
longer download times. A relationship between QoS and QoE
is deﬁned by the authors based on previous experiences and
user expectations with skilled workers having a higher QoE
expectation than unskilled users. Authors suggest that the
G.1030 framework required updating to meet modern day
contexts.
The literature review suggests that elements of QoS and
QoE have been investigated with proposed methods designed
to accommodate for both metrics; however, the existing lit-
erature reviewed does not account for QoS and QoE with
the integration of cryptographic processes. The context of the
literature reviewed focused towards UAV only. This research
investigates the effect of cryptographic constructs on the QoS
and QoE of unmanned control vehicles. The packets size
examined in this scenario focuses on a small size only to
reduce the likelihood of packet corruption and delay obtained
from larger packets [10].
IV. EXPERIMENTATION PROCEDURE
This section discusses the apparatus, metrics and context
selected for the experiments. The simulation programme
selected is Proteus ISIS 8 professional with the Microchip
PIC18F45K22 selected as the microcontroller. The Serial
Peripheral Interface (SPI) is selected as the physical layer
(i.e. OSI model) to transmit and receive messages between
each microcontroller on the network. The AEAD security
constructs used are CCM and TinyAEAD running AES
(128-bit key variant).
The test procedure examines the latency for the transmitting
microcontroller to process and transmit the packet, the duration
of the packet to propagate to the receiving microcontroller
and to process the received packet. The impact of the software
security constructs on latency is measured in metres per
second travelled by the unmanned vehicle. All timings are
taken from the simulator used.
Additional distance is observed in the experiments with and
without security measures applied. Latency and instantaneous
throughput is measured at each hop to measure the overall
duration between the packets travelling from the source to
the destination node and the amount of packets transmitted
within a sixty second time sample. All timings and packet
counts recorded are taken from the simulator used. It
is assumed for this scenario that no noise is present on
the wireless channel and the UGV vehicle is travelling at a
top speed up to 30 mph and the UAV top speed up to 135 mph.
Metrics used for the test procedure are seconds for the
sampling time of the test and number of hops to state how
many intermediate devices were between the start and end
node.
Conﬁguration of the components selected are as follows, the
crystal frequency selected is 4 MHz to replicate low powered
industrial microcontrollers with packet sizes of 36 bytes. A SPI
divisor of 16 is chosen to replicate bandwidth of a wireless
link of 250Kbps [11] as calculated using the following formula
[12]. It is assumed that each hop is 100m. The test procedure
varied the number of intermediate hops on the linear network,
starting from one hop to the maximum of six hops. Sample
time of sixty seconds was selected.
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT
The results obtained from the simulation conducted are
presented in this section. The graphs draw the effect of
the AEAD cryptographic constructs on the operation of the
unmanned vehicles in terms of the additional distance travelled
by the unmanned vehicles before responding to the message
received. Results are benchmarked in comparison to the dis-
tance travelled by the unmanned vehicles without security
measures applied. Table 1 tabulates the distance travelled
before responding to the command over multiple hops without
security measured applied.
Table I
DISTANCE TRAVELLED BY UNMANNED VEHICLES BEFORE RESPONDING
TO THE COMMAND (NO SECURITY)
NUMBER OF
HOPS
UGV
(METRES PER SECOND)
UAV
(METRES PER SECOND)
1 0.030 0.138
2 0.060 0.276
3 0.090 0.414
4 0.120 0.552
5 0.150 0.690
6 0.180 0.828
Figure 3 graphs the additional distance travelled by a UGV
before acting upon the command. The x-axis represents the
intermediate number of hops between the base station and
UGV; the y-axis represents the distance travelled by the UGV
in metres per seconds (m/s) before responding to the command
transmitted.
Figure 3. Simulation results of the additional distance incurred by a 30 mph
UGV over multiple hops using a 36 byte packet
The results displayed in Figure 3 indicate that the AEAD
constructs increase the distance travelled by the UGV before
responding to the packet received. CCM has a greater inﬂu-
ence with the additional distance incurred being greater than
TinyAEAD operating at three rounds. The inﬂuence of the
AEAD constructs on the distance travelled increases with more
intermediate hops. Figure 4 graphs the additional distance
travelled by a UAV before acting upon the command.
Figure 4. Simulation results of the additional distance incurred by a 135 mph
ﬁxed wing UAV over multiple hops using a 36 byte packet
Data obtained in Figure 4 suggests that the AEAD
constructs increase the distance travelled by the ﬁxed
wing UAV before responding to the packet received. The
TinyAEAD construct had a reduced impact in comparison
to CCM with less distance travelled over each intermediate
hop. The additional distance travelled increased with a larger
number of intermediate hops between the base station and
the ﬁxed wing UAV.
Comparison of the two graphs presented in Figure 3 and
Figure 4 indicates that the speed of the unmanned vehicles
inﬂuences the additional distance incurred by the device
before the command is acted upon as the distance travelled
by the UAV with AEAD constructs was larger in comparison
to the UGV. The number of intermediate hops between the
base station and the unmanned vehicles also increases the
distanced travelled by the unmanned vehicles, suggesting that
the more intermediate hops there are on the network the more
distance the unmanned vehicle travels before responding to
the command.
Analysis of the two AEAD constructs in this experiment
indicates that standardised ﬁxed approach of CCM has a bigger
impact in comparison to the adjustable TinyAEAD construct
on the distance travelled by the unmanned vehicles; suggesting
that the strength of the underlying block cipher inﬂuences the
processing throughput.
VI. DISCUSSION
The discussion uses the results obtained from the result
and analysis of experiments and applies the ﬁndings to the
case scenario presented in Section II. To examine the effect
of security on QoS and QoE, instantaneous throughput is
selected to sample the number of packets received at each
hop in a sixty seconds time frame in relation to the distance
travelled. It is assumed that the QoS is the instantaneous
packet throughput from the base station to the vehicle; whilst
QoE is the additional distance travelled by the vehicle before
responding to the command. The effect of cryptography in
terms of QoS and QoE for a 36 byte packet is presented in
Figure 5.
Figure 5. Balance of QoS and QoE of a UGV with and without secure
communications. Additional distance travelled by the vehicle is represented
by the ﬁlled line and the instantaneous throughput is represented by the dashed
line
Data graphed in Figure 5 indicates that the instantaneous
packet throughput and distance travelled by the UGV with
CCM selected as the security measure intersect at four hops,
whilst TinyAEAD at three rounds and no security measure-
ments do not intersect up to the six hops sampled. This
suggests that the trade-off for QoS and QoE is at least two
hops less in comparison between TinyAEAD and no security.
Figure 6 examines the scenario of a ﬁxed wing UAV.
Figure 6. Balance of QoS and QoE of a ﬁxed wing UAV with and
without secure communications. Additional distance travelled by the vehicle is
represented by the ﬁlled line and the instantaneous throughput is represented
by the dashed line
Results displayed in Figure 6 suggests that the QoS
and QoE trade-off using the CCM security measure is two
hops, whilst TinyAEAD at three rounds intersects at four hops.
The discussion has highlighted two areas that contribute
towards inﬂuencing the point where QoS is balanced with
QoE; ﬁrst the speed of the moving vehicle inﬂuences the point
between balancing QoS and QoE. Secondly the selection of the
cryptographic construct is important as constructs operating at
ﬁxed number of rounds reduce the number of hops travelled
before the QoS and QoE balance is meet whilst adjustable
cryptographic constructs are better suited for systems that
require balancing for systems with more intermediate hops.
VII. CONCLUSION
The relationship between QoS and QoE is demonstrated
through the additional distance travelled by the unmanned
vehicles and the instantaneous throughput obtained. The
selection of the unmanned vehicle as the speed of the vehicle
has an inﬂuence on the balancing point between QoS and QoE.
Selection of the security constructs is a determining factor
on the balance between QoS and QoE as adjustable security
constructs is better suited for applications where the vehicle
is travelling at a fast speed over small number of hops whilst
ﬁxed security constructs are better suited for situations where
security of the vehicle is of priority.
Future work is to conduct the experimentation undertaken
in this paper in a real world scenario to verify the ﬁndings
obtained.
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